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Richard A. Falk* The Quest for World Order:
The Legacy of Optimism
Re-Examined
President MacKay, ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour for me
to be here as a Killam lecturer. Let me start by telling a story that
illustrates the direction of what I want to say. A Frenchman, an
American and a Jew were all suffering from an incurable disease.
They were told by a doctor that they had three weeks to live and
each was asked what he would like to do. True to stereotype, the
Frenchman said that he would take his mistress to the country and
dine every night at a three-star restaurant. The American said that he
would move to Philadelphia because it would make the three weeks
seem so much longer. The Jew replied, "I'll go to another doctor
for a second opinion." What I would like to do is to offer this
lecture as a second opinion on the condition of the world, which I
think one would have to be very depressed about at this time from
almost any point of view.
If one looks back to 1945, to the end of World War II when the
United Nations was created, the Western liberal democracies
offered an image of a future that looked as if it would moderate the
disposition toward warfare, toward unilateral use of force and
toward the kind of geopolitics that had brought two earlier world
wars to this century. I think that from the point of view of 1983,
those earlier hopes have been fundamentally destroyed. There is
very little serious expectation attached to the whole idea of
international organization at present, except for very technical
matters which, though important, don't reach the kind of peace and
security agenda that I want to concentrate on tonight. Also I think
the superpowers have substantially discredited themselves as
leaders of any kind of effort to moderate the role of power in
international affairs. All the while the march of technology has
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meant that the consequences of conflict, both for the participants
and for the world as a whole, are much more severe than they had
been at an earlier stage.
Let me try to address this topic from this general perspective: that
it is hard to look the world in the eye and not be very pessimistic
about the future. This is not just a matter of approaching 1984,
though that helps, because I think one of the reasons to be
pessimistic is that the sovereign state (which is the main source of
power and influence in the world) is, as Orwell anticipated, not a
liberating source in the late twentieth century but, rather, is a
constraining force. Although Orwell was preoccupied with the
problem of state socialism and those societies where the state
occupied the entire political space and the relations between the
state and society, I think that his negative prophecy applies far more
generally than that. I think we have reached a point, unfortunately,
in political development where when it comes to national security
there are no political democracies left in the world. I am making
what may sound like a provocative statement deliberately. But I
think if one looks back at the history since World War 11, one will
see that what has gradually emerged, particularly in the United
States but generally in the liberal democracies, is an invisible
government that consists of the military sector of the bureaucracy
together with the intelligence agencies that have enormous influence
over the allocation of resources, shaping of information and
opinion; virtual control over the range of responsible debate, the
range of candidates that can be elected to high offices, and it has
substantially nullified the electoral process and representative
institutions as ways of challenging existing policy. In other words,
formal democracy exists but it doesn't have the capabilities of
producing any real challenge to the national security consensus that
has been shaped by this invisible government that is not accountable
or elected, but persists in a way that considerably constrains the
electoral process and political leaders that occupy the commanding
heights of government.
Prometheus, we know, incurred the wrath of Zeus, the greatest
among the Greek gods, because he defied Zeus' will and befriended
mankind. In Aeschylus' play, Prometheus Bound, Prometheus
explains this undertaking on behalf of humanity to an inquiring
Chorus:
The Chorus asks: "Did you perhaps go further than you have told
us?"
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Prometheus replies: "I caused mortals to cease foreseeing
doom." In other words, the gift of Prometheus was to allow
humanity to conceive of its future without foreseeing doom.
And the Chorus asks: "What cure did you provide them with
against that sickness?"
Prometheus: "I placed in them blind hopes."
Chorus: "That was a great gift you gave to men."
Prometheus: "Besides this, I gave them fire."
In most portrayals of the Prometheus legend the gift of fire and
from it, technological prowess, are treated as the essence of
Prometheus' defiance of the gods and of his empathy with
humanity. In this fifth century B.C. interpretation by Aeschylus the
material part of Prometheus' contribution to human development is
subordinated and the spiritual gift is highlighted. And the essence of
this spiritual gift is that humanity can only function creatively when
it hasn't foreclosed its future by foreseeing doom. In other words, it
needs blind hopes in order to be able to cope with the challenges
confronting it. Therefore, it is only these blind hopes that allow
human existence, not only to be tolerable, but to build towards a
future better than the past. In a sense, optimism about the larger
problems of society has always rested on this possibility. We are
liberated to act for the future we prefer by this blindness to the threat
of doom.
This insight of Aeschylus' into Prometheus' gift is almost too
obviously relevant to our world to require any extended comment.
The threat of nuclear and ecological disaster overhangs our
circumstances with an ominous plausibility. Our dominant political
consciousness continues to pride itself on realism; thinking the
unthinkable, and on somehow either being immobilized by the
proximity of the apocalypse or by escaping into some form of
mind-numbing addiction. The addiction may be drugs or false hopes
in the form of believing in the possibility of recovering from nuclear
war, or of finding the technological fix that performs some kind of
miracle that will bring prosperity to everyone on earth or uncover a
way to migrate from our troubled planet to a network of space
colonies located somewhere in the asteroid belt, where the
gravitational fields of the earth and moon converge. In other words,
realism in this sense reduces to either a form of complacent failure
to acknowledge danger or some kind of very trivializing escape that
rests on the very technology that produced the danger.
I intend a sharp distinction here between "blind hopes" and
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"false hopes." Blind hopes are a necessary angel for human
development creating confidence or perhaps faith in the unseen but
desirable. They are a confidence that is premised upon conviction
and commitment and is not deterred by the calculation of odds or the
scale of obstacles. False hopes, in contrast, adjust us to an
intolerable destiny by a refusal to see things as they are. They
counsel passivity and acquiescence and keep humankind stuck in
present distortions. What I want to affirm here is that we need
Prometheus' gift of blind hopes if we are to summon the vision and
energy to create a future for our species that both upholds our will to
survive and our aspiration to create something better. The quest for
world order is a political expression of this outlook and can be
concretized by the conviction that a world without war can be
achieved at some point in the future, however distant and unlikely
such an achievement may now appear. The weak expression of this
outlook is that the process of making such a future, regardless of the
difficulty of attainment, is essential for the human spirit. The
German playwright Gerter put it this way: "He who strives, him we
may save." If we renounce striving, then we have acquiesced in this
destructive spiral of circumstances that leads us to be very
dependent upon a perpetual balance of terror to avoid some kind of
catastrophe. That very dependence is itself a catastrophe over time,
because it so undermines the premise of human solidarity that is at
the base of any kind of civilizational identity. Even if a nuclear war
were never to occur, the constant readiness to engage in that kind of
ultimate destructive behavior is itself extremely debilitating for the
kind of human spirit that is necessary to build a better future.
The stronger expression of this outlook is that there are various
processes of change that are already under way around the world
that provide some solid foundation for thinking that it is not
implausible to alter the framework of the political life of the planet
and that we cannot meaningfully assess what the prospects are for a
new type of world order to emerge. What I am really trying to
express here is that even if the odds were less than a tenth of one
percent that a warless world could be achieved, its pursuit has
become a normative necessity given the character of modern
weaponry and the implications of its threatened use. But it is not
necessary to feel that one is engaged in such a heroic act, because
there is no real way of determining that the prospects are quite that
unlikely.
I emphasize this perspective as strongly as I do because it collides
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so directly with what is becoming the prevailing cultural mood in
the West. This mood is dominated by what I would call the realist
consensus which says that an alternative to the present arrangement
of power and of disposition toward conflict is not attainable, and
furthermore that the present set of circumstances is not really so
terrible and is probably sustainable. I can illustrate this by reference
to the problems of nuclear weaponry, but the same analysis pertains
to environmental decay, world poverty, and the alarming trend
toward the militarization of both internal and international politics
virtually everywhere in the world. Recently, and partly in response
to the Euro-American peace movement, and to apocalyptic
warnings sounded by a variety of voices, spokespeople for the
dominant elite have began to address the issue of nuclear weapons,
thus breaking an eerie silence of some thirty years after their
appearance at the end of World War 11. Michael Mandelbaum' s The
Nuclear Future, and Harvard University's collective study Living
with Nuclear Weapons, are specimens of a broader tendency to
attempt to reformulate the realist consensus in the nuclear age. Their
fundamental position is that it is not feasible to contemplate nuclear
disarmament; war is inherent and unconditional in international
affairs and can be mitigated only by the avoidance of irrational wars
or features of warfare. Nuclear war can be avoided because it is a
form of irrational warfare. In fact some supporters of the realist
consensus claim more. They argue that nuclear weapons have
actually contributed to war prevention by inhibiting recourse to war,
at least between advanced industrial countries, and that it's very
likely that had nuclear weapons not existed a third world war would
have occurred by now and that we owe, to some extent, the peace
that has existed in the advanced industrial sector of the world, to the
presence of these weapons. It would also be true that given the
technology of non-nuclear weaponry a third world war would have
been extraordinarily destructive, and therefore this is not a small
consideration in evaluating the overall world situation. At the same
time, I think it has to be said that peace in the First World has been
achieved partly at the expense of tremendous militarization and
accentuation of turmoil and conflict in the non-Western Third
World. The rather disturbing pattern that has emerged in the nuclear
age is that the white prosperous part of the world has fundamentally
lived at peace while the non-white poorer parts of the world have
done 99% of the fighting and dying, and will continue to do so.
There is in effect a kind of global apartheid that exists when it
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comes to issues of war and peace, which is partly a consequence of
this kind of technology.
The realist consensus argues that it is not feasible to contemplate
nuclear disarmament as this would presume trust between sovereign
states of rival disposition, that it could only be made reliable by
establishing a new political framework that would entail the creation
of what amounts to world government, and that this framework is
virtually impossible to imagine given the vitality of state
sovereignty and nationalism as a continuing focus for human
loyalty. Beyond this the results of science and technology are
presumed to be essentially irreversible. In effect, now that nuclear
weapons have been produced and used there is no way back into the
Edenic garden of nuclear innocence. It is also argued from this
realist perspective that since the initial use of the weapons against
the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki both superpowers have
exhibited a due concern for the avoidance of their subsequent use.
The purpose of nuclear weapons, it is argued, is mainly to deter
their use by others. Deterrence assures that no sane leader would
risk the consequences of their use given the prospect of devastating
retaliation. In this central respect there are reasonable grounds to
believe that deterrence can keep the nuclear peace for the indefinite
future. This summary of the realist position oversimplifies its
argument to some extent, but I think it accurately captures its central
thrust. I think it is fair to say that from the point of view of logical
probability and instrumental reason, there is a continuing
plausibility to this way of thinking about the future. But its
difficulty is that it rests its hopes on a very inadequate conception of
the dangers, risks and costs of continuing on the present path. It
exhausts its positive energy by the calculation of possibilities by
way of past patterns and current conventional wisdom. As such it
excludes genuine improvement and suppresses the terrible moral
consequences and reckless political risks of perseverance. I find this
realist view of how to adjust to the nuclear age as totally
unacceptable, because it really does rest so fully on what I have
called false hopes. As our most ancient wisdom reminds us, people
perish without a vision.
At this time there is a desperate need for some kind of credible
mobilizing vision in Western civilization. We live in a period when
throughout the world there is an extraordinary disenchantment with
what has been the source of hope for the future. The source of hope
for much of the liberal West has been largely premised on a mixture
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of political moderation and technological progress. Both of these
foundations of hope have been constrained partly by the kind of
technology that has emerged and the consequences and effects of it
and partly by the fact that the scale of problems in the world today is
global. Yet our organizational framework for handling so many of
the problems continues to be partial, fragmentary, and fundamen-
tally rests on the problem-solving capacities of separate and very
unequal states.
But there is an equal disillusionment with revolutionary
perspectives associated with Marxism and with state socialism,
which had been expected to both make production more efficient
and the distribution of production much more equitable. It was also
believed that state socialism would liberate the state from serving
the dominant and exploiting classes of society. But the experience
has been that state socialism has had a very disillusioning record of
performance. The state has dominated its own society and rather
than being a source of liberation, has proved to reproduce
oppression in a very extreme form. In this sense the world is at a
point where none of the ideologies or ideological perspectives that
had been thought to be the carriers of progress are any longer
endowed with vitality and mobilizing power, so that an ideological
and normative vacuum exists.
The kind of world order vision that is needed seems to me to rest
on three kinds of foundations. Partly it has to be built upon some
conception of human nature and the potential for human
development in new directions that encompass the species as a
whole. There is nothing that we know from the studies of cultural
anthropology that would preclude the possibility of an emerging
species identity that allows part of our sense of participation to be
citizens of the globe as well as citizens of particular communities in
the world. A second dimension can be conceived either historically
or functionally as based on the particular urgencies and capabilities
of this historical epoch, which suggest that without a globalist
orientation the problems of war and peace, of poverty, of ecological
defense and ecological balance, cannot be dealt with in any
sustaining fashion. In other words an objective foundation exists in
the actual challenges confronting human society that suggests the
basis of reordering the underlying political framework. The third
element of the foundation of a vision of world order is normative. It
is based on the imagery of what is desirable and what would be life
enhancing at this stage of human development. That also invokes a
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conception of the planet as a whole created in part by the very vivid
portrayal of the earth that we have received in our lifetimes from
early space missions, when for the first time we saw the earth as a
whole. That wholeness is much more compelling as a reality for the
imagination than are the separations that are drawn by the political
maps of the world.
For the first time we also have the kind of communication and
awareness that could provide the grounding of a normative order
that encompassed the planet without in any way altering the
diversities of particular identities, many of which are much smaller
than those identities associated with the sovereign state. In that
sense, many of the actual identities of people around the world are
trapped within larger and abstract political entities that have
emerged throughout the history of the state system. What I am
really suggesting as the direction of this vision is the liberation of
society from the state, both from below and from above. The state
is, in this sense, simultaneously too large to satisfy the particular
identities of many people living within it and too small to deal with
the functional and aspirational identities of a planetary culture.
The organization of the world into sovereign states and the
possibility and aspiration for a global civilization and a global
political order is analogous to the kind of transitional reality that
Hugo Grotius, the founder of international law, confronted when he
dealt with the transition from feudal Europe to the state system in
the early seventeenth century. As is generally known, Grotius was
appalled by the carnage of the 30 Years War, when a mixture of
sectarian, religious, and political passions in the early seventeenth
century produced a period of unrestrained warfare that left many
medieval cities in central Europe in ruins and caused casualties that
have been estimated to be a half to three-quarters of the population
of those areas.
Grotius wrote in a famous passage:
Throughout the Christian world I observed the lack of restraint in
relation to war such as even barbarous races should be ashamed
of. I observed that men rushed to arms for slight causes or no
cause at all, and that when arms have once been taken up there is
no longer any respect for law, divine or human. It is as if in
accordance with a general decree frenzy had openly let loose for
the committing of all crimes.
This observation could obviously be transposed as a description of
the current world situation. If one looks at the world today there are
more than a dozen wars raging out of control and barbarous tactics
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are often quite prominent. The periodic genocidal massacres of
civilians in the course of the Lebanon strife, the criminal tendency
by Iran to use unarmed children to detect mines on the battlefields
separating Iranian from Iraqui armed forces, the recent characteris-
tic wave of killings of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, the
bloodthirsty tactics of the counterrevolutionary forces in Central
America, and the apparent reliance on poison gas in the form of
yellow rain by Communist forces in Afghanistan and Kampuchea,
are among the instances that come most quickly to mind.
The Grotian achievement was to perceive in that circumstance of
apparent decay of civilizational decency an opportunity to recreate
the future along far more secure lines than conventional wisdom
would have allowed in the seventeenth century. There is a particular
kind of genius that perceives a positive possibility in defiance of the
despair that is prevalent at a time of disintegration. This important
possibility was expressed by Tolstoy in War and Peace. Hovering
over Moscow during the winter of 1812 was Haley's Comet which
was widely regarded by Russians at the time as an ominous
indication of what was to come. Looking into the same sky at the
same comet Count Pierre, Tolstoy's highly individualistic hero
found hope and inspiration. The Chinese put the same duality of
underlying symbols in less decisive terms in their proverb, "Two
men sleeping in the same bed have different dreams." Grotius
somehow understood that latent within the turbulence and warfare
of the seventeenth century in Europe was a shared community of
values arising from a common adherence among rulers to
Christianity in the broad sense. On the basis of appeals to
conscience, the medieval Christian heritage of normative unity, and
to a common framework of law serving the interests and outlook of
sovereign states that were then emerging, Grotius was able to put
forward a conception of an ordered international society that found
increasing adherence. This reconciliation of medieval. and statist
perspectives provided a means to put realistic restraints on recourse
to and conduct of war by way of a set of normative guidelines. The
conscience of Christian rulers was expected, not totally without
reason, to substitute for an enforcement mechanism and to allow an
international order that lacked central institutions to still avoid the
relapse into barbarism that had prompted Grotius to write in the first
place.
In the decade subsequent to Grotius as statism gradually
triumphed over the nonterritorial spiritualism of the middle ages,
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the more positivist strain in Grotian thought about international law
held sway. That is, the natural law basis of rules was supplanted
almost totally by the notion of consent of the representative of the
sovereign state, either expressly in treaty form or implicitly in the
form of customary international law. In the middle of the eighteenth
century, Emmerich de Vattel, the Swiss international jurist,
supported this tendency to shift the locus of normative authority
from the Catholic Church to the governmental centers of the leading
powers. However, Grotius writing prior to the Peace of Westphalia
of 1648, which is usually treated as the threshold date of the modern
state system, anticipated this shift. The radical nature of Grotius'
vision was duly acknowledged by the inclusion of a scholarly
treatise on the Papal Index as allegedly dangerous to the
maintenance of the faith. In a fundamental sense, the quest for
world order, its claim of possibility, always rests on challenging the
established wisdom and authority of the day, shattering the realist
consensus of its particular day. We may not now rely upon a Papal
Index, but we have a status frame of reference that makes it appear
like tilting at windmills to seriously propose a framework for
political community that does not rest upon the primacy of the state
and perseverance of war as a social institution. The ideological
power of the state to intimidate, especially intellectuals who are
notoriously frightened of seeming foolish, dampens our capacity to
mobilize the energies of our people behind the quest for a world
order liberated from statism and militarism.
It is also intriguing to note that Grotius was concerned with
excluding more radical conceptions of world order that might
otherwise have gained acceptance if his proposals were not allowed
to provide a normative grounding for the diplomacy of his time. He
writes:
Confronted with such utter ruthlessness many men, who are the
furthest from being bad men, have come to the point of
forbidding all use of arms to the Christian, whose rules of
conduct above everything else comprises the duty of loving all
men. To this opinion sometimes John Ferus and my fellow-
countryman Erasmus seem to incline, men who have the utmost
devotion to peace in both Church and State; but their purpose, as
I take it, is, when things have gone in one direction, to force them
in the opposite direction, as we are accustomed to do, that they
may come back to a true middle ground.
In effect, Grotius does not deem it practical or beneficial to propose
pacificism as the implication of membership and participation in a
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Christian community of sovereign states. He regarded total
opposition to war as extreme. It was an understandable extremity in
light of the excesses of unrestrained warfare that were contemporary
with his observations, yet in his judgment deeply undesirable
because it was ill-suited to the domain of separated sovereignties
and aggressive diplomacy. At minimum, Grotius felt, defensive
force must be authorized to safeguard the security and interests of
the state. In effect, Grotius can thus be understood as restoring
viability in his time to the realist consensus that then prevailed
rather than mounting what I would call an idealist challenge of the
sort associated with Erasmus' espousal of a full pacifism. Possibly
this restoration that Grotius proposed was always flawed to the
extent that it seemed to promise political leaders discretion to wage
war on behalf of the state provided they at least pretended to adhere
to some broad framework of norms. In effect, Grotius can be
indicted for having invited the whole tradition of hypocrisy on the
part of governments with respect to international law where it is
very frequently invoked to berate ones enemies or to rationalize
one's own conduct, but very rarely used as an independent source of
guidance that might indeed fulfill the dictates of conscience.
In the eighteenth century this prompted Montesquieu in "The
Persian Letters," to dismiss international law as, in his words, "a
science which explains to kings how far they can violate justice
without damaging their own interests. What a dreadful idea, to
systematize injustice in order to harden their consciences, and then
turn it into sets of rules..." That is, up until now the realist
consensus with its absolute statism and unconditional endorsement
of military necessity in warfare has made a mockery of those claims
that over time international law would humanize statecraft around
rules and procedures of restraint.
If we return briefly to the contemporary situation, there is an
interesting parallel to Grotius' conception of what is possible in
some recent statements by former high government officials in the
United States. McGeorge Bundy, Robert McNamara, and George
Kennan are prominent instances. Also relevant here is the issuance
of the recent Pastoral Letter by the United States Catholic Bishops
which again reflects a sign of disturbance by those who had been
very much part of the established order with the shape that the
realist consensus was assuming under contemporary conditions. In
effect, there is a loss of confidence in the prevailing formulations of
the realist consensus that deterrence as such is sufficient to avoid the
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impression that a continuous arms race and an unqualified
disposition to fight wars of extermination is not itself a relapse into
barbarism on a scale that imperils the survival of political culture;
and that if it is not corrected will agitate more radical resistance of
the sort that these relatively moderate critics are eager to avoid. By
and large, this neo-Grotian formulation insists that the role of
nuclear weapons be minimized as much as possible, regardless
almost of the practical arguments to the contrary that are advanced
on behalf of their geopolitical utility. McNamara recently has
declared that nuclear weapons "are totally useless except only to
deter one's opponents from using them." All these revisionist
positions share an advocacy of an unconditional renunciation of
first-use options, a position interestingly enough that has already
been taken unilaterally by the Soviet Union.
At the same time, these authors, all of whom share an underlying
acceptance of the realist consensus and are not advocates in any real
way of a new world order, are very eager to preempt the reformist
position so as to avoid more extreme proposals for revision.
McGeorge Bundy, for instance, says "we cannot escape from the
world of nuclear deterrence." He regards E. P. Thompson's
"anti-nuclear polemics" and Jonathan Schell's "absolute demand
for an end to national sovereignty and a turning toward world
government" as unacceptable distractions from the real challenge
- reducing the dangers that stem from nuclear deterrence, while
continuing to rely on it. In other words, these thinkers are
responding to people like Thompson and Schell much as Grotius
responded to Erasmus. They say it's understandable that people are
worried by what the current leadership is doing, but that they are
going overboard and what is needed is not some radical alternative
vision but an adjustment of the realist consensus that takes account
of these criticisms but still recognizes the inevitable centrality of
war in human experience and the inability of sovereign states to
really get rid of nuclear weaponry in any total sense because of its
connection with the defense of state interests against potential
enemies.
In this regard, the views of George Kennan are particularly
interesting because he is an archetypal realist, having written very
generally on the role of power and interests as properly controlling
the shape of international relations. Kennan in a quite remarkable
passage says that he now has come to a conclusion that he calls a
concession, a turn of mind of such recent origin, as he puts it, that it
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is not reflected in any of his earlier writings. Kennan writes that he
had always resisted the suggestion that war, as a phenomenon of
international life, could be totally ruled out, partly because demands
for the outlawing of war were usually cast in universal and therefore
wholly impractical terms, partly because it was so hard to see what
other ultimate sanction for the protection of national interests could
be devised. But Kennan now writes, and I quote,
I am now bound to say that while the earliest possible elimination
of nuclear weaponry is of no less vital importance in my eyes
than it ever was, this would not be enough in itself to give
Western civilization even an adequate chance of survival. War
itself as a means of settling differences, at least between the great
industrial powers, will have to be in some way ruled out, and
with it there will have to be dismantled, for without this the
whole outlawing of war would be futile, the greater part of the
vast military establishments now maintained with a view to the
possibility that war might take place.
In effect, Kennan seems to be suggesting that the realist consensus
can no longer be reconciled with human well-being, possibly even
with human survival. When conversion experiences of this sort
occur at this level of society it suggests that the culture as a whole
may be crossing a threshold of new possibilities. At the very least,
the legitimacy of the old ordering framework is being seriously
questioned by those who had previously been its ideological
architects. Yet Kennan's view remains one of suggesting that the
existing elite mend its ways. There is little evidence, at this time at
any rate, that the elite is listening. It is continuing basically to
pursue its traditional ways of handling problems of state power and
although it is conscious of rising opposition, it has essentially turned
a deaf ear and new weapons systems are being developed. One
cannot find a great effort anywhere to create a public mood of
receptivity to bolder experiments in international affairs.
What I am trying to argue, then, this evening is that it is
beginning to be possible to believe that something better is
emerging into view as a possibility. But that something better is not
a continuation of the traditional reformist line of world order
thinking founded more or less during the birth traumas of the
modern state system in Europe some four centuries ago. Such a
perspective saw the rise of the state as a step forward at the time in
terms of economic efficiency and political order and regarded the
state system as reforming itself over time with the help of the
growth and spread of civilizing ideas and the gradual removal of
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misery by way of economic expansion. This outlook was greatly
strengthened by the Industrial Revolution, the early 19th century,
and the wider notion that technology would constantly enable
human society to further extend its mastery over nature. There were
of course many road blocks and periods of economic depression and
warfare, but reason, economic growth and the framework of state
seem quite consistent with a generally optimistic view of the future
of human society. This statist vision of progress seems to have come
close to the end of its line. At best, it can operate at this stage as a
holding operation, staving off the worst and muddling along. But it
is under a variety of darkening shadows: a continuous arms race of
global scale; periodic food shortages causing widespread famine; a
rising risk of nuclear war; an explosive mixture of mass poverty and
population pressures in non-Western countries; a variety of
fundamental ecological hazards involving contamination and
climate change; a declining capacity, of even democratic
governments, to obtain the consent of their citizenry for
fundamental policies; and a sickening series of terrorist assaults and
official instances of counter-terror and torture.
To look to the state under these circumstances as a liberating
actor with respect to world order is to be dangerously deceived. To
expect from international law a framework for moderating conflict
among states is also fanciful, although law will continue to provide
some assistance to governments in handling exceedingly complex
relationships across their borders. If there are grounds for optimism,
as I believe there are, then they consist in the reawakening of
societal forces, within states and across boundaries, that are the
bearers of new conceptions of political and legal order, as well as
new conceptions of internal security and national security. These
new societal energies are reacting to the menace and inadequacies of
statism in both internal and external dimensions. More concretely, I
have in mind the worldwide growth of grassroots and informal
politics, of non-governmental organizations and movements, of
peace movements with links across frontiers, of citizens who yearn
for participation in natural political communities that correspond
with their true ethnic and national identities, and of citizens who
conceive of themselves as caught up in a struggle to save the species
as a whole, and not just any one part of it, and also of a variety of
groups, movements, and individuals who resist the abuses of state
power in all parts of the world.
In this emerging encounter between state and society that is
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taking place in different forms everywhere, religious perspectives
are playing an increasing role in providing auspices and a liberating
sense of alternatives. The future of world order depends on the
course and outcome of this encounter between state and society, as
well as on the fashioning and embodying of demilitarizing
conceptions of security for societies to assure their survival and
autonomy.
I think it is important, in locating one's optimism for the future in
the awakening societal energies and the more active religious role in
challenging the primacy of the state, not to be overly romantic about
popular sentiments. There still is an attachment to war and to
military victory. We have seen it in the United States in relation to
this Grenada intervention. It was evident in the Falklands war, in
what is now sometimes called the Thatcher factor. We can't pose a
militarized state versus a pacific society as rigid alternatives, but I
do think that the creative energies based on possibilities for the
future are emerging outside of these formal structures of state
power. And I think in this struggle international law will have a
special, largely unexplored role to play. If law begins to be
conceived as an instrument of society, as well as of the state, then it
can be used to express political grievances and expectations.
Citizens can begin to demand that their own government adhere to
international law as part of a wider quest for world order. Nuclear
activists are increasingly using domestic courts and other arenas
with some success to argue a civic duty to obstruct state behavior
that violates international law, especially through preparations for
agressive war or initiating uses of nuclear weapons.
The idealist challenge to statism does not seek to demolish the
state as a political form but only to eliminate its oppressive features.
The central quest is to reconstruct the state to serve human needs in
political, economic, and cultural spheres of activity; to create a
responsive state in place of the autonomous state and thereby to
encourage a political leadership that is at last alive to the growing
challenge of global problems.
Let there be no illusions. This is a long process, one that will be
filled with many disappointments. It is a process that needs to begin
where it can begin and then to spread as far as it will. Such an
evolution will not succeed unless societal energies challenge statism
within the Soviet bloc as well as within the West. At some stage it
will also have to transform the character of many Third World
countries as well as those in the advanced industrial regions. The
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world is objectively moving toward this global phase. What it
requires now is a positive ideology that will guide this transition and
encourage its implementation on a political, psychological, and
legal level, and to inspire confidence that a new world order is
emerging and is worth supporting; that one isn't, in other words,
entrapped in the constraints of the realist consensus. Until such a
vision begins to inform our political action there is bound to be a
sense that what we try to achieve through the existing framework of
the state is not going to work.
Let me bring these assessments of the present situation to a
conclusion by setting forth in a very schematic form what I regard as
the program for this new world order. It seems to me that it can be
divided between immediate goals, longer goals, and even more
remote goals. In the immediate category are those that will buy
time, and I list just five. First, expose the realist consensus as
crackpot realism. Secondly, adopt a no-first-use posture toward
nuclear weapons. Thirdly, limit the development of weaponry and
strategic doctrine to defensive categories and roles. Fourthly,
formulate some version of a freeze on the arms race. And finally,
work toward declarations and treaties of prohibition on the use of
weapons of mass destruction of any kind under any circumstances.
The longer-term aspect of this program for a new world order
concentrates on its domestic dimension. To me it is absolutely
necessary that democracy be revitalized in relation to national
security. In effect the state within the state that has grown up during
this period of permanent preparation for war needs to be
substantially dismantled and reoriented. Perhaps this whole
revitalization of democracy can be focused in terms of the need for a
Magna Carta for the Nuclear Age. In other words, the citizens
demanding of the state a new framework of action built around an
acceptance of international law and of the Nuremberg Obligation,
not toward other countries but towards one's own society as a matter
of self-interest and of the dignity of ones own society. In effect, the
purposes of revitalizing democracy are to reclaim the control of
security for society, to take it away from experts and from those that
monitor secret information on behalf of intelligence agencies, and to
unleash the imagination of society to work toward less militarized
forms of societal resistance against external enemies. In its essence,
the purpose is to find the political will as widely as possible to
initiate a movement for the abolition of war as a social institution.
War has become as antiquated in the twentieth century as slavery
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was in the nineteenth century, and there is, it seems to me, a great
latent willingness on the part of the peoples of the world to join in an
abolitionist struggle of this sort. And finally to conceive of global
citizenship and grassroots citizenship as the foundation of human
solidarity at a local and global level that supplements the kind of
political identities that most of us now feel. I think that even more
remote than these very ambitious objectives is the eventual need, if
we want, to have a world order that rests on genuine peace. But
there will have to be a much greater capacity on the part of all
societies to find ways to orient production much more around
genuine needs than is currently the case.
The poet W. H. Auden once wrote: "We who are about to die
demand a miracle." Perhaps it only seems like a miracle because
whatever we may say in our words, in our hearts we are secret
adherants of that realist consensus. From the point of view of the
realist consensus, a new world order of the sort I have been
describing would indeed be a miracle.
For those who join in supporting the idealist challenge, moving
toward this new state in world order, what is being proposed seems
to me to be much less a miracle than a project based on common
sense, surely more plausible than accepting the bizarre claim of
fifteenth century astronomers that the earth was not flat. Clearly, it
seems to me, we have reached the point where this kind of globalist
conception of political community is as real to our prospects for
survival and development as in a physical sense the roundness of the
world was real for those who navigated it.
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